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MIAMI LAV QUARTERLY
vehicles,11 storage rooms,12 lodging rooms,'9 offices, 1' and public bowling
alley lockers. 5
The holding in the instant case is consistent with decisions rendered in
all the cases where it has been found that the alleged bailee only had mutual
but non-exclusive access to, or power of physical control over, premises and
personal property of the alleged bailor. The principal case, one of only three
appellate cases concerning coin operated lockers,O is in accord with an
earlier decision, rendered by another court, against the defendant company
withholding relief for loss of goods on bailment principles.'?
BANKRUPTCY - ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR REPRESENTING
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
An attorney was awarded fees for services rendered in connection with
a corporate reorganization proceeding begun under § 77 B1 of the Bankruptcy
Act. His capacity was that of counsel for two sets of bondholders, one of
which held "deficit series" bonds, while the other possessed bonds of the
"surplus series". Since the latter was to be paid first, any successful argu-
ment by the attorney on behalf of the former would reduce the amount
available to the "surplus series" bondholders. Judge Learned Hand held,
that although fees are usually denied to attorneys who represent conflicting
interests in corporate reorganization proceedings, an allowance should be
granted but should be reduced by, at least, one-third. Silbiger v. Prudence
Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1950).
Section 2412 of the Bankruptcy Act gives to the Bankruptcy Court'
the power to award reasonable compensation for services rendered by at-
11. Ex Parle Mobile Light & Ry. Co., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924); Suits
v. Electric Park Amusement Co., supra note 5; Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, SuPra
note 1 (in the preceding eases no car keys were left with parking lot personnel); The
Parking Lot Cases, 27 CEo. L.J. 162.
12. Slaughter v. Levy, 214 Mo. App. 95, 257 S.W. 1063 (1924) (both landlord
-inc tenant had keys to rented storage rooms).
13. Wills v. Vest, supra note 4 (tenant used lodging rooms for storage of personal
property; landlord retained key thereto for purposes of maid service).
14. Broaddus v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Muskogee, supra note 5 (landlord had
pass key and rendered janitor service).
15. Cornelious v. Berinstein, 183 N.Y. Misc. 685, 50 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1944)(locker accessible to alley operator and person who rented locker).
16. Marsh v. American Locker Co., 72 A.2d 343 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1950); Dyer v.
American Locker Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't. 1947)(per curiam); Keleman v.
American Locker Co., 182 N.Y. Misc. 1058, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 411 (City Ct. 1944) (latter
case decided on question of neligence, not bailment).
17. Dyer v. American Locker Co., supra note 16.
1. 30 STAr. 544 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1946).
2. 52 STAr. 900 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 641 (1946).
3. Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1 (1949); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944).
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torneys.4 This authorization grants to the court a wide latitude in the
allowance of fees,' which will not be reversed unless it is clearly abused."
Such discretion is only modified by the doctrine that the services rendered
must be of benefit to the final reorganization plan. T The guideposts, that
have been established to determine what the reasonable compensation is,
are: the extent and nature of the services; 8 the time and labor involved;9
the character and importance of the matter in hand;10 the value of property
or the amount of money involved;11 the learning, skill and experience exer-
cised;' 2 the results accomplished 18 with particular relation to losses sustained
by security holders and their creditors;1' the ability to pay;' and the ab
soluteness or contingency of the fees.18 What a comparable fee in private
employment would be is no criterion'7 since attorneys in reorganization pro-
ceedings are held to act in a quasi-public capacity. 8 Nor is the fact that
no debtor, bondholder, debenture-holder, or creditor resisted the application
for allowances of irifluence upon the court."9
The general policy of the court is to be economical in these proceed-
4. Woods v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 312 U.S. 262 (1941); Newman &
Bisco v. Realty Associates Securities Corp., 173 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1949]* In re Uni-
versal Lubricating Systems, Inc., 165 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1947); Eddy v. Keliby, 163 F.2d
56 (2d Cir. 1947); In re Detroit International Bridge Co., 111 F.2d 235 (6th Cir.
1940); In re Consolidated Motor Parts, Inc., 85 F.2d 579 (Zd Cir. 1936).
5. Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 142 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1944);
Shnader v. Reading Hotel Corp., 105 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1939); Silver v. Senllin Steel
Co., 98 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1938); in re A. Herz, Inc., 81 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1936).
6. In re 32-36 North State St. Bldg. Corp., 164 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1947); In re
Seville Court Apartments Bldg. Corp., 134 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1943); Silver v. Scullin
Steel Co., supra note 5.
7. 52 STAT. 900 (1938); 11 U.S.C. 643 (1946); Warren v. Palmer, 132 F.2d 665
(2d Cir. 1942); Cooke v. Bowersock, 122 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1941) (beneficial services
can be objecting to plans proposed by others); Greensfelder v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., 114 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1940) (compensation for services rendered in matters col.
lateral to or indirectly affecting the proceedings should not be allowed); Sullivan &
Cromwell v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 96 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1938); In re Star Elec
tric Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 58 (D. N.J. 1946).
8. Oklahoma Ry. v. Johnston, 155 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1946); In re Hydraulic
Machinery, 87 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Mich. 1949); In re Star Electric Motor Co., supra
note 7; In re Mortgage Guarantee Co., 40 F. Supp. 226 (D. Md. 1941).
9. Oklahoma Ry. v. Johnston, supra note 8; Teasdale v. Sefton Nat. Fibre Can Co.,
85 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1936); In re Hydraulic Machinery, supra note 8.
10. Oklahoma Ry. v. Johnston, supra note 8; In re Hydraulic Machinery, supra note
8; In re Star Electric Motor Co., supra note 7.
11. In To Hydraulic Machinery, supra note 8; In re Star Electric Motor Co., supra
note'7; In re Mortgage Guarantee Co., supra note 8.
12. Oklahoma Ry. v. Johnston, supra note 8; In re Hydraulic Machinery, supra
note 8.
13. Oklahoma Ry. v. Johnston, supra note 8; Teasdale v. Sefton Nat. Fibre Can
Co., supra note 9; In re Star Electric Motor Co., supra note 7; In re Mortgage Guaran-
tee Co., supra note 8.
14. In re Star Electric Motor Co., supra note 7; In re Mortgage Guarantee Co.,
supra note 8.
15. Oklahoma Ry. v. Johnston, supra note 8; In re Ilydraulic Machinery, sunpra
note 8.
16. In re Hydraulic Machinery, supra note 8.
17. London v. Snyder, 163 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1947); Stark v. Woods Bros. Corp..
supra note 7.
18. Stark v. Woods Bros. Corp., supra note 7.
19. In re Detroit International Bridge Co., supra note 4.
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ings,20 therefore its primary duty is to ascertain the maximum amount al-
lowable for the administration of an estate before it gives any consideration
to the fees.2 Although § 243,22 which requires that the services be beneficial
to the plan to be compensable, 23 is to be construed liberally,2 4 the courts
have refused compensation in several instances where the services were of
benefit but where circumstances justified its denial.25 Such circumstances
arise-when the attorney originally expected payment of his fees by a private
party;26 when he has bought or sold stocks of the debtor corporation while
working on the reorganization plan;27 when he has duplicated work done
by another attorney;28 or when he has represented conflicting interests.29
In furthering the economy doctrine, the-pattern has been so set that
where any of the preceding circumstances exist the fees have been denied
completely.' 0 Good faith, lack of fraud, and benefit to clients have been
held to' be unavailable defenses to the attorney representing conflicting
interests,3' since it was well settled, prior to the noted case, that where con-
flict exists no more need be shown to support a denial of compensation.' 2
The instant decision is an extreme departure from the doctrine that
fees are to be denied completely where the attorney is representing con-
flicting interests. This is evidenced by the allowance of partial fees, in the
present case, although the attorney was acting to the detriment of both par-
ties, as compared to a prior decision, which denied any compensation in
spite of the fact that the attorney's actions were of benefit to the interested
parties."
Section 241, which allows reasonable compensation, does not require
that fees be denied entirely where an attorney is representing conflicting
20. Brown v. Gerdes, supra note 3; London v. Snyder, supra note 17; Cochenour
v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., supra note 5; In re Standard Gas & Electric. Co., 106
F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1939).
21. Application of Pinetree Associates, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. N.Y. 1948),
22. 52 STAT. 900 (1938); 11 U.S.C. 643 (1946).
23. See note 5 supra.
24. In re Mortgage Guarantee Co., supra note 8.
25. Woods v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, supra note 4; In re 32-36 North
State St. Bldg Corp., supra note 6; London v. Snyder, supra note 17; In re Sheridan View
Bldg. Corp., 154 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1946); Greensfelder v. St. Louis Public Service
Co.,supra note 7; In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., supra note 20; In re Forty-One
Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 100 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1938); In re A. Herz Inc.,
supra note 5; United States v. Apple, 292 Fed. 935 (8th Cir. 1923); In re Star Electric
Motor Co., supra note 7; In re Midland United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399 (D. Del. 1946).
26. Greensfelder v. St. Lbuis Public Service Co., supra note 7.
27. 52 STAT. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 649 (1946); Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg.
Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949)
28. Stein v. Hemker, 157 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1946); In re Standard Gas & Electric
Co., supra note 20.
29. Woods v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, supra note 4; In rs 32-36 North
State St. Bldg. Corp., Supra note 6;-London v. Snyder, supra note 17; United States v.Apple, supra note 25; In rs Midland United Co., supra note 25.
30. See note 24 supra,
31. Woods v. City Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, supra note 4.
32. See note 28 upra.
33. Loew v. Gillespie, 90 Misc. 616, 153 N.Y. Supp. 830 (1915), aff'd, 173 App. Div.
889, 157 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (st Dep't 1915).
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interests. This writer suggests that reasonable compensation should be con-
sidered as reasonable under the surrounding circumstances, and that instead
of perfunctorily denying compensation where the attorney has represented
conflicting interests, the court should consider the merits of the case and
allow partial fees where warranted.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DOING BUSINESS-NOTICE BY
REGISTERED MAIL TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Appellant, a mutual insurance corporation, conducted all business by
mail with citizens of another state, using existing members to solicit ap-
plicants. Appellant failed to comply with a state statute, where the insurance
was solicited which required those selling certificates of insurance to re-
gister with the State Corporation Commission.' Acting under the statute,
the State Corporation Commission issued a cease and desist order, based
on service by registered mail, restraining turth& violation of the act. Held,
that under the Fourteenth Amendment,2 service by registered mail satisfied
due process since the activities of the non-resident corporation constituted
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of the state, thereby
subjecting it to the authority of the state. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
70 Sup. Ct. 927 (1950).
It is established that an in personam judgment cannot be based on
service by registered mail on an individual or corporation, neither of whom
are present in the state issuing such judgment.' In determining whether a
corporation, which is domiciled elsewhere, is present within a state, the
courts have held that if a corporation is doing business within a state it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the forum.4 Whether a foreign corporation
may be held to be doing business within a state is a question of fact, the
determination of which depends on the effect of all actions in the state in-
volved.5 'Generally the presence of corporate property and agents, conduct-
ing corporate activities, is requisite to doing business within another state. 6
However, in International Shoe Company v. Washington,' the Court re-
1. VA. CODE § 3848(47) et seq. (1942).
2. U.S. CONST. AbiEND. XIV.
3. Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); England Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 (1884); Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Iowa
v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 570, 64 P.2d 1267 (1937).
5. Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (1943); Bootes Hatcheries &
Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal.2d 526, 205 P.2d 31 (1949) (presence of single
agent within state); Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Bailey, supra note 4; Min-
nesota Tribune Co. v. Comm't, 228 Minn. 452, 37 N.W.2d 737 (1949); Hastings v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 84 N.Y.S.2d 580, 274 App. Div. 435 (1948). •
6. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); State v. Winstead, 66 Idaho 504, 162 P.2d 894 (1945);
accord, Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
7. 326 U.S. 310, 324 (1945).
